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Introduction
Few principles of American jurisprudence are more revered and
faithfully obeyed than the one requiring courts to extend the holding of a
case only as far as the facts require.I Adherence to this tenet of judicial
process is considered essential to the courts' functioning as a co-equal
branch of government. Judges who violate this principle do more than
invite courts in subsequent cases to dismiss the "extraneous" statements
as dicta; they may undermine the legitimacy of the judicial branch by
creating the perception that they are more like robed legislators than
jurists.2
Courts have assumed some of their most important powers without
specific authority from the Constitution, and have long recognized that
their legitimacy rests largely on psychological grounds.' The ephemeral
nature of judicial authority has led judges to invoke the Constitution only
when necessary, and when constitutional interpretation is unavoidable,
to implicate only the provisions required by the facts of the case.4 If
courts are bound by principles identified in similar cases and extend the
law in the current case no more than the facts require, then constitu-
tional interpretation will be guided by rational principle and not by
judges writing their opinions into law.'
1. Identifying the principle, or ratio decidendi, of a case is no simple task. Goodhart
wrote that "[w]ith the possible exception of the legal term 'malice,' [ratio decidendil is the most
misleading expression in English law, for the reason which the judge gives for his decision is
never the binding part of the precedent." Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a
Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 162 (1930).
2. See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973).
3. Although there is some evidence that the framers intended the Supreme Court to have
the power of judicial review of congressional legislation, the Constitution does not specifically
grant the Supreme Court such authority. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803); W. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 306 (1987) (the framers of the Constitution
"wanted the judges to be independent of the president and of Congress, but in all probability
they also wanted the federal courts to be able to pass on whether or not legislation enacted by
Congress was consistent with the limitations of the United States Constitution."); C. PRITCH-
ETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 152-56 (1984). Judge Robert Bork
wrote that Marbury was not the first time the Court asserted the power to invalidate legisla-
tion. Eleven years before Marbury, in Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), most of the
justices refused to comply with a statute because it assigned them duties not of the judicial
nature specified in the Constitution. R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 24 (1990).
4. In a concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288
(1936), Justice Brandeis reviewed the standards the Court had developed to avoid passing on
constitutional questions, stating that the Court "will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'" Id. at 347 (Bran-
deis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phil. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigra-
tion, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
5. Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780), an English jurist whose Commentaries on the
Laws of England became one of the most influential writings in Anglo-American legal theory,
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The process by which courts came to assume their role as final arbi-
ters of the Constitution demonstrated an understanding of the impor-
tance of voluntary compliance with their decisions.6 Judicial decisions
are not self-enforcing, and there must be widespread acceptance that a
court has the right to decide an issue even when there is disagreement
over the way a particular case is resolved.7 Implementation of judicial
directives, even from the Supreme Court, requires the cooperation of
other branches of government and affected parties. With some important
exceptions, the Court has generally understood just how far public toler-
ance of controversial decisions will permit it to go.' The justices have
wrote that the true function of judges was to "declare" the law. Judges were "the depositaries
of the law; the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by an
oath to decided according to the law of the land." W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHETT, COURTS,
JUDGES & POLITICS 12 (1961). Thus, according to Blackstone, judges did not decide cases
based on their own values. Id. at 14.
6. Sometimes compliance has been difficult to secure. See Jaffree v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala. 1983) (an Alabama federal judge, in an opinion
described by the solicitor general as one "in which the district judge thumbed his nose at the
Supreme Court," determined that the Supreme Court had "erred in its reading of history"
when it held that prayers in public schools violated the Constitution's prohibition against es-
tablishment of religion); Ex parte NAACP in re State ex rel. Patterson v. NAACP, 265 Ala.
349, 91 So. 2d 214 (1956), rev'd and remanded sub nom. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), on remand sub nom. Ex parte NAACP in re State ex rel. Patterson,
268 Ala. 531, 109 So. 2d 138 (1959), rev'd and remanded sub nom. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 360 U.S. 240 (1959), on remand sub nom, NAACP v. State, 274 Ala. 544, 150 So.
2d 677 (1962), rev'd and remanded sub nom. NAACP v. Alabama ex ret. Flowers, 377 U.S.
288 (1964) (the same case went to the Supreme Court three times after Alabama refused to
comply with the Court's order to allow the NAACP to do business in the state); Williams v.
Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955) (Georgia executed a black man convicted of murder even though
the Supreme Court had overturned the conviction of another defendant in which the identical
method of excluding black jurors was used). See also Williams v. State, 211 Ga. 763, 88 S.E.2d
376 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 950 (1956); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (a
celebrated case that generated much additional litigation to force compliance).
7. There have been efforts to curtail the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, to
change the number of justices in an effort to influence its decisions, and to require a two-thirds
majority of the Court before a statute can be invalidated, none of which became law. See S.
NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 343 (1989). In
1868, Congress passed, over President Johnson's veto, a law removing from the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court appeals from federal circuit courts in habeas corpus cases, which the Court
upheld in Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
8. Among the more famous examples of self-inflicted crises of legitimacy were Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The
Court invalidated thirteen laws of Congress between 1934 and 1936, mostly involving New
Deal recovery statutes, thus precipitating FDR's "court-packing" plan. See, e.g., Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). See also Roosevelt's speech of Mar. 9,
1937, S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 41-44. See generally L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS
HONORABLE COURT 33, 66-67 (1985); A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 147-50
(1987); W. REHNQUIST, supra note 3, at 71.
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usually avoided exercising authority in a way that alarms large segments
of the population. 9
Although not well understood by the public, the principle of stare
decisis provides stability to the common law that allows the judiciary to
make controversial decisions without being considered dangerous to the
other branches of government and the rights granted in the Constitution.
The authority of already decided cases is thought to limit the discretion
of individual judges. Even changes in court membership that result in
swings in judicial philosophy rarely undermine the legitimacy of the judi-
ciary, even while serving as a stark reminder that courts are political
institutions.10
9. Rehnquist observed,
We want our federal courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, to be independent
of popular opinion when deciding the particular cases or controversies that come
before them. The provision for tenure during good behavior and the prohibition
against diminution of compensation have proved more than adequate to secure that
sort of independence. The result is that judges are responsible to no electorate or
constituency.
W. REHNQUIST, supra note 3, at 236. Rehnquist added that because an elected president
appoints and an elected Senate confirms nominees to the federal courts, "public opinion has
some say in who shall become judges of the Supreme Court." Id Rehnquist acknowledged
that the Supreme Court is influenced by public opinion:
I was recently asked at a meeting... whether the justices were able to isolate them-
selves from the tides of public opinion. My answer was that we are not able to do so,
and it would probably be unwise to try. We read newspapers and magazines, we
watch news on television, we talk to our friends about current events. No judge
worthy of his salt would ever cast his vote in a particular case simply because he
thought the majority of the public wanted him to vote that way, but that is quite a
different thing from saying that no judge is ever influenced by the great tides of pub-
lic opinion that run in a country such as ours.
Id. at 98.
10. Judges who adhere to already decided principles may be viewed by some as exercising
"restraint," while those who more creatively depart from precedent may be described as "ac-
tivist." Those terms may, however, be as unhelpful in describing judicial philosophy as the
terms "liberal" or "conservative." For example, from about 1887 to 1937, an "activist" yet
indisputably conservative Supreme Court used the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to strike down economic legislation.
The principle of "substantive due process" was first confined to the dissents and minority
opinions of the Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1887) (Field
& Strong, JJ., dissenting) (refusing to interfere with a regulatory statute, but accepting the
obligation to appraise the legislation on substantive due process grounds); The Slaughterhouse
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (refusing to invalidate on due
process grounds a monopoly granted by state statute); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887) (separate opinion of Field, J.); In re The Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886)
(Harlan & Field, JJ., dissenting); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878) (Bradley, J.,
concurring). Majority opinions articulated the principle beginning in the Wabash, St. Louis &
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), and Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v.
Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), cases. The justices who invalidated economic and health
regulations were every bit as activist as those of the Warren Court of the 1960s who extended
procedural rights under the fourth through eight amendments. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,
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Although the perception that even judges who enjoy lifetime tenure
cannot wreak havoc on the Constitution may assuage concerns about an
imperial judiciary, it cannot be seriously argued that judges are or have
ever been confined to the role of merely discovering and announcing the
law." That judges add a creative element to the law, and can almost
always distinguish or even ignore a precedent, is no longer open to de-
bate.' 2 Indeed, while stare decisis may limit individual judicial discre-
tion, the flexibility of the common law, which is one of its great strengths,
makes it susceptible to manipulation.
Gradual development of the law may be necessary to protect the
courts' fragile legitimacy. It can lead, however, to a frustratingly slow
evolution of constitutional principles. Important questions may remain
unanswered for decades. In the absence of guidance from the Supreme
Court, key federal constitutional provisions are subjected to widely vary-
ing interpretation by state and lower federal courts. The framers of the
Constitution created a federal system where state sovereignty would be
respected; ' 3 they may not, however, have approved of fundamental pro-
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. The sociological jurisprudence school of legal scholars challenged Blackstone's theo-
ries by demonstrating the importance of social science to law, and by suggesting that to a
significant degree, the law is what judges say it is. Oliver Wendell Holmes, who served on the
Supreme Court from 1902-1935, had the best platform from which to expound on the princi-
ples of the sociological jurisprudence movement. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881);
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). Other influential members of the
movement included Roscoe Pound (1870-1964), who was to become dean of the Harvard Law
School, and Benjamin Cardozo (1870-1938), who served on the Supreme Court from 1932-
1938. See R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922); B. CAR-
DOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
In the 1920s, a group later called "legal realists" broke from the sociological school. In
challenging the "declaratory" theory of Blackstone, and the modest criticism of the sociologi-
cal jurisprudence movement, the "realists" argued that legal study should concentrate on judi-
cial decisions and their effects, suggesting a stronger role for other social sciences. See
generally K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1951). Perhaps, the most influential legal
realist was Jerome Frank, who later became a federal court of appeals judge. Frank applied
Freudian psychology and theories of child development to empirical data on judicial behavior
in his seminal work, J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
12. The common law has long been recognized not as static, but as a "dynamic and grow-
ing thing and its rules arise from the application of reason to the changing conditions of soci-
ety." McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613 P.2d 737, 740 (Okla. 1980). The
Supreme Court noted in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884), that "[t]his flexibility
and capacity for growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common
law."
13. See generally A. Cox, supra note 8, at 62-67; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803) (holding that the Supreme Court has the power to review Acts of Congress); Bar-
ron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the fifth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and, by application, the procedural rights guaranteed under the fourth through
eighth amendments, were a check against federal power and were not applicable to the states).
1990]
visions of the Constitution meaning one thing in one state and something
very different in another. 4 Certain provisions of the Constitution are of
such fundamental importance that they should not be subject to local
custom or interpretation, but must be implemented through national
standards. '
Jurisdictional differences may be the most troublesome when first
amendment rights are at stake. Freedom of speech and press are so es-
sential to a democratic society they have been placed in a "preferred po-
sition."' 6  Although other rights in the Constitution are clearly
important, it has long been held that a self-governing society must pro-
tect zealously its right of freedom of communication to function prop-
14. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the California constitution could provide for individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the federal constitution, so long as there was no taking
without just compensation or violation of any other federal constitutional provision. 447 U.S.
at 83 (Rehnquist, J., writing for the majority).
15. The difficulty of determining what is to be a federal constitutional standard, and what
will be subject to local prerogative, has challenged American courts throughout their history.
See Labunski, Pennsylvania and Supreme Court Libel Decisions: The "Libel Capital of the
Nation" Tries to Comply, 25 DUQ. L. REV. 87 (1986) (discussing implementation of increased
state autonomy to determine libel standards involving private person plaintiffs). In nonfederal
question cases, the "diversity of citizenship" clause of the Constitution allows residents of one
state to sue residents of another in federal court; however, easy access to federal courts led to
abuses in several cases. See Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276
U.S. 518 (1928) (overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)); Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that in diversity cases at common law,
the laws of the several states should be the rules of decision of the federal courts. Judiciary
Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). Justice Story, writing for the Supreme Court in Swift, decided
that "the laws of the several states" referred only to state statutes, and did not cover the
unwritten or common law of the states. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19. Thus, in the absence of state
statutes controlling a case, federal couris were free to adopt and apply such general principles
of law as they thought applicable.
The Court eventually held in Erie that federal courts should apply state law in diversity
actions whether the law of the state is declared by its legislature or by its highest court. Later,
the Court became dissatisfied with Erie and held that where "countervailing factors" of federal
interest are of overriding importance, federal policy rather than state law can be applied. See
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); see also Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the
Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957).
16. For development of the "preferred position" theory, see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 529-30 (1945) (finding that presumption supporting legislation must be weighed against
preference given to freedoms of first amendment); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115
(1943) (holding that it is immaterial that ordinance is nondiscriminatory because first amend-
ment rights stand in preferred position and cannot be easily restricted). The genesis of the
preferred position theory is thought to be Justice Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27
(1937) (stating that neither liberty nor justice would exist without freedom of thought and
speech).
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erly.17 Any statute, court order, or administrative policy that restricts
freedom of speech or press is subject to strict judicial scrutiny and must
clear numerous constitutional hurdles.18
Having recognized for nearly half a century the near-sacred position
that freedom of speech and press occupy in our society, the Supreme
Court would be expected to demonstrate an acute concern for the effects
of its first amendment decisions, including the consequences of failing to
settle important issues. Although it has often protected first amendment
rights from infringement by the legislative and executive branches of gov-
ernment, the Court has been less sensitive to the problems its own rulings
have caused.
This Article urges the adoption of procedures by which courts de-
ciding first amendment cases would be able to extend the holding beyond
the facts. These changes would allow courts to formulate rules of law
that are based on, but not limited to, the circumstances of the present
case, and would not require courts to wait indefinitely for a future case to
settle other important issues. This proposal does not cut judges loose to
create law in an ad hoc, chaotic manner that will undermine the legiti-
macy of the courts; relevant precedents will still be carefully measured
and the new rules will emanate from them.19 The new procedures
would, however, prevent compelling first amendment questions from lan-
guishing indefinitely, and thus would be in keeping with the special treat-
ment the first amendment has long received.
Granting courts this additional authority may be unsettling to some,
especially those convinced that judges already legislate or otherwise
abuse their authority whenever whim moves them. It will be argued,
however, that this proposal is no more controversial, and is in fact a
more forthright acknowledgement of judicial power, than the manipula-
tion to which the law is already subjected. By requiring courts to iden-
tify clearly the portions of their opinions that are not grounded in the
facts of the case, this proposal may have the effect of permitting greater
first amendment protection, while not increasing more general judicial
authority.
17. See generally Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REV.
245-55; Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
18. The Supreme Court has declared, for example, that "[a]ny prior restraint on expres-
sion comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity." Or-
ganization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). See also Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (balancing freedom of expression against sixth amend-
ment right to a fair trial).
19. For a critical examination of the "ad hoc balancing" theory of the first amendment,
see Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912-14
(1963). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961).
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I
Unsettled First Amendment Issues
The Supreme Court renders judgment in, at most, a few first amend-
ment cases a year. 20 Even when it has the opportunity, the Court may
decline to clarify an important first amendment issue, leaving it unsettled
for years, or even indefinitely. Admittedly, the Supreme Court may gain
valuable information from observing how lower courts handle unresolved
questions. However, the wisdom gained from such delays often comes at
a high price. The interim period, in which lower courts seek to anticipate
what the Supreme Court would do under similar circumstances, often
leads to confusion and inconsistency within and among jurisdictions, and
to a corresponding diminution of first amendment rights.21
The delay in resolving essential first amendment questions may
cause an erosion of respect for Supreme Court opinions. Faced with seri-
ous gaps in first amendment jurisprudence, lower courts must fill in the
answers that the Supreme Court failed to provide.22 Once accustomed to
exercising such discretion, it may be tempting for lower courts to "re-
write" future Supreme Court opinions with which they disagree.
This Article examines one area of first amendment law where case-
by-case adjudication and limiting the holding to the facts have all but
rendered useless an important invasion of privacy tort. Although it had
the opportunity, the Court failed to clarify what standard of liability ap-
plies to false-light invasion of privacy actions brought by private person
plaintiffs against news organizations, and thus pushed such plaintiffs to-
ward bringing defamation actions. This cutting off of false-light privacy
cases for private persons serves neither their interests, nor those of the
news organizations that must then defend the more potentially inhib-
iting defamation suits.23
20. In its 1989-1990 term, the Supreme Court continued the trend of reviewing fewer
cases. See Greenhouse, Case of the Shrinking Docket: Justices Spurn New Appeals, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 28, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
21. See, e.g.. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374 (1984)
(the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the opinions of federal courts in its jurisdiction, its
own state courts, and the implied holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., by finding that in cases involving private person libel plaintiffs, the burden of proof is on
the defendant), rev'd, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
22. A good example is Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), which rejected a claim
that the first amendment grants absolute privilege to journalists to refuse to divulge the names
of sources to a grand jury. Because the Court's decision was based on an unrepresentative set
of circumstances, and because of the thoughtful dissent by Justice Stewart, lower courts have
largely ignored the majority opinion and acted as if Justice Stewart had spoken for the Court.
23. For a discussion of how costly libel suits can be to both plaintiff and defendant, and
why such suits rarely lead to a satisfying conclusion, see generally R. BEZANSON, G.
CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS (1987) [hereinafter R. BEZANSON].
See also D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 102.04 (1990).
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The area of false-light privacy was chosen for two reasons: First, it
would be difficult to find a clearer example of how the Court ignored its
own precedents and derailed the momentum leading to a definitive ruling
on the question of standard of liability only because the facts in the case
did not precisely fit the Court's expectations; and second, it was chosen
because false-light privacy, and its closely related cousin, defamation, are
matters of substantial first amendment interest. Moreover, the Court's
inaction in this area has spawned numerous contradictory rulings not
only from state to state, but also within the same jurisdiction.
A. Dictum in One Case Becomes Ratio Decidendi in Another
Contiguous decision-making would, in effect, grant judges limited
authority to write dicta that will have the precedential value of ratio
decidendi.24 Such a scheme may seem at first to be a shocking enlarge-
ment of judicial authority. It will be argued, however, that courts fre-
quently transform dicta from previous cases to ratio decidendi in the suit
presently before them. Forthright admission by judges that this is rela-
tively common would be new, and, to many, refreshingly honest.
First amendment law is replete with examples of extraneous, even
innocuous statements, that later became the foundation on which signifi-
cant speech and press rights were built. The potential importance of
dicta is nowhere better illustrated than in Justice Sanford's statement in
Gitlow v. New York 25 that the first amendment was applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.26
24. More than half a century ago, Goodhart suggested five rules for determining how the
ratio decidendi of a case can be found. See Goodhart, supra note 1, at 182. His first two rules
explain how the principle of the case is not to be found: 1) The principle of a case is not found
in the reasons given in the opinion; and 2) the principle is not found in the rule of law set forth
in the opinion. Id These first two rules suggest that it is not enough to know what the judge
said. One must know the relationship between the facts of the case and the decision. The
principle of a case cannot be established without knowing the facts of that case. But Good-
hart's third rule indicates that there is even more to the issue: 3) The principle is not necessar-
ily found by a consideration of all the ascertainable facts of the case and the judge's decision.
Id. Not all facts of a case were relevant to establishing the principle of the decision. One must
have a standard to determine which facts were relevant: 4) The principle of the case is found
by taking account (a) of the facts treated by the judge as material, and (b) his decision as based
on them. Id. These four statements provide rules by which to search for the ratio decidendL
Goodhart offers one final guide to relevance: 5) In finding the principle it is also necessary to
establish what facts were held to be immaterial by the judge, for the principle may depend as
much on exclusion as it does on inclusion. Id. Goodhart then provided 10 rules for finding
what facts are material and what facts are immaterial. Id. at 182-83.
25. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
26. Id. at 666. Sanford wrote as follows: "[W]e may and do assume that freedom of
speech and of the press-which are protected by the [flirst [a]mendment from abridgment by
Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due
process clause of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment from impairment by the States." Id
1990)
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The statement was unnecessary to the Court's decision upholding Git-
low's conviction. Nevertheless, it greatly enlarged the scope of first
amendment protection by making it a check against state as well as fed-
eral power.
Dicta are sometimes so closely intertwined with essential elements
of an opinion that it is nearly impossible to tell where one ends and the
other begins. Judicial opinions that do not provide at least some elabora-
tion or examples would be of limited value to lower courts trying to im-
plement appellate court standards. But some judges have seized
seemingly unimportant words in prior cases to launch a new constitu-
tional principle when the right case presented itself.2
The transformation from dicta to ratio decidendi may take many
years. Among the most famous dicta ever written in a first amendment
case were Chief Justice Hughes' statements in Near v. Minnesota 29 that
prior restraint would be permissible under certain circumstances.30
Although the Supreme Court later recognized that Hughes was merely
providing examples, 31 a federal district court subsequently treated them
with a respect normally reserved for ratio decidendi in issuing an injunc-
tion restraining a magazine from publishing an article about a hydrogen
bomb. 2 Judge Warren, who recognized in United States v. Progressive
that his injunction against the magazine was unprecedented, accepted the
dicta in Near as the standard by which to measure the constitutionality
of the injunction.33
27. Six years later in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), Chief Justice
Hughes wrote the following statement: "It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the
press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the
[fjourteenth [a]mendment from invasion by state action." Id. at 707.
28. Justice Stone, for example, was apparently able to frequently hide narrow statements
that he later transformed into broad principles. A former law clerk wrote that he was "like a
squirrel storing nuts to be pulled out at some later time. And there was mischief as well as
godliness in his delight when his ruse was undetected and the chestnuts safely stored away."
W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHETT, supra note 5, at 394-95.
29. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
30. Hughes wrote, "No one would question but that a government might prevent actual
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops." Id. at 716. Despite the dictum, the Court held the injunction
prohibiting further publication of The Saturday Press was an unconstitutional prior restraint in
that case.
31. In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), Chief Justice Burger
wrote in dissent that the rights under the first amendment are not absolute: "There are other
exceptions [such as Holmes' aphorism concerning the right to shout "fire" in a theatre], some
of which Chief Justice Hughes mentioned by way of example in Near v. Minnesota." 403 U.S.
at 749 (Burger, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See also id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).
32. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), dismissed, 610
F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
33. Id. at 996.
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A more remarkable transformation of first amendment law emerg-
ing from dictum stems from a footnote tucked away in the Supreme
Court case of United States v. Carolene Products Co.34
Carolene Products involved Congress' authority to regulate inter-
state transportation of certain milk products. In a matter of economic
regulation having nothing to do with the first amendment, Justice Stone,
writing for the Court, suggested that although courts should grant legis-
latures substantial discretion to regulate the economy, they may need to
scrutinize more closely laws that interfere with the workings of represen-
tative government, including, presumably, communication. Stone ar-
gued that laws interfering with first amendment rights should be
examined more carefully because they are less susceptible to correction
through democratic processes. Within a decade, this statement grew to
become the dominant theory of the supremacy of the first amendment,
forever changing the way freedom of speech and press is balanced with
other societal interests. a5
Justice Stone's footnote became the "preferred position balancing
theory" of the first amendment under which any restriction on expres-
sion carries a presumption of unconstitutionality.36 Considered together,
the dicta in Gitlow applying the first amendment to the states through the.
fourteenth amendment, the statement in Near that became a standard for
judging exceptions to the prior restraint rule, and the Carolene Products
footnote that led to nearly invincible protection of the first amendment,
show that statements not directly tied to the facts of the case already play
a significant role in constitutional interpretation.
B. Creating the Principle of "Contiguous Decision-Making"
Given the imprecision of language and the redundancy necessary to
properly instruct those who carry out court directives, judicial opinions
will invariably contain statements not essential to deciding the case.37 As
previously shown, such statements occasionally form the basis for a new
constitutional principle. In the usual case, however, because of the im-
portance of maintaining the perception that judges are interpreting the
34. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Stone, in writing the opinion, restated the "reasonable
man" theory presuming the validity of regulatory legislation unless there was no rational basis
on which legislators acted. He then stated in the famous footnote that judicial deference to
legislative acts may not be appropriate when first amendment rights are involved, but may
instead require "more searching judicial inquiry." Id.
35. Bork characterizes this enlargement of the first amendment as "pernicious." R.
BORK, supra note 3, at 58-61.
36. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
37. See Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1972 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 134.
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law and not creating it, the statements labeled "dicta" are often ignored
or derided."a
Contiguous decision-making would authorize courts, within rela-
tively narrow limits, to extend the holding beyond the facts when three
conditions are present: First, when significant first amendment issues
would otherwise remain unsettled; second, when those issues have been
peripherally addressed in relevant precedents; and third, when the ex-
tended principle is "contiguous" with the central elements of the current
case. The additional statements, although not directly emanating from
the present facts, will have the same precedential value of those that did
and may not be dismissed as dicta in subsequent cases.
The principle of contiguous decision-making will not lead to immu-
table rules which can be applied evenly in every case. Nevertheless, it
will provide courts with the opportunity to settle, within rational limits,
important first amendment questions which would otherwise languish
indefinitely.
Implementing contiguous decision-making will not be easy. Only
those cases which meet certain criteria will be appropriate vehicles for
courts to go beyond the facts of the case and settle anticipated issues.
Contiguous decision-making must include incentives for courts and at-
torneys to identify problems that may arise in future cases.39 It will also
require courts to divide their opinions into sections directly traceable to
the facts and sections that deal with anticipated questions not directly
derived from the facts of the case.
The proposed changes should not be characterized as "advisory
opinions." The Supreme Court wisely declined to offer advisory opinions
in its earliest days, and this decision has withstood the test of time.
Rather, these changes offer courts the limited authority in first amend-
ment cases to anticipate issues closely related to the facts in order to
guide lower courts in dealing with important first amendment questions.
The alternative to such authority is interminable delay while appellate
courts wait for the case with just the right facts to emerge.
38. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (criticizing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). In
these cases, the Court disapproved dicta from prior cases which conflicted with the holding of
the case at bar.
39. Litigants will undoubtedly resist paying attorneys for time spent briefing courts on
anticipated issues that do not directly affect their case. However, courts could insist that the
additional work on "contiguous" issues, which should not add greatly to the time required to
file the brief on issues emanating from the present facts, could be part of the attorney's pro
bono activity and thus should be rewarded as such by both the law firm and the courts.
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III
Case-by-Case Adjudication: Problems for the First
Amendment
Some first amendment principles have evolved with the speed of a
glacier. That the first amendment itself lay largely dormant from 1791,
when it was ratified by the states, to 1919, when the Supreme Court ap-
plied it to sedition cases arising during World War I, reflects the first
amendment's gradual development.' Not until 1925 did the Court de-
termine, in an almost offhand remark, that the rights guaranteed under
the first amendment were applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 The Court did not consider a case
40. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919). The Court was presented with a number of opportunities prior to 1919 to confront
first amendment claims, which it always rejected. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915) (upholding motion picture censorship because film exhibition
was simply a profit-making business and not "part of the press of the country."); Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (upholding an injunction against labor picket-
ing, on grounds that the speech as a means for accomplishing an unlawful purpose was con-
duct, not speech); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (upholding on other than first
amendment grounds a Boston ordinance requiring a permit from the mayor for any public
address in a public park). See generally Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years,
90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981); Blanchard, Filling the Void: Speech and Press in State Courts prior to
Gitlow, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 14 (Chamberlin and Brown eds. 1982)
(arguing that state experience with first amendment rights influenced federal courts).
Blanchard demonstrates that state courts developed experience in first amendment litigation
that informed the Supreme Court when it finally concerned itself with formulating rules under
the amendment.
41. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). It would be another 36 years
before the Court began applying the fourth through eighth amendments to the states. See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (applying "cruel and unusual punishment" provision
of the eighth amendment to state death penalty cases); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (right to trial by jury extended to state prosecutions); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(requiring states to permit appeal of a juvenile court decision); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (both applying procedural rights of
criminal suspects to the states); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying "self-incrimina-
tion" provision of fifth amendment to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(extending sixth amendment right to counsel to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(applying the "exclusionary rule," first required in federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), to the states); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(holding that the death penalty is not inherently cruel and unusual).
Gitlow was all the more surprising because only three years earlier in Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922), the Court flatly held that "the Constitution of the United States
imposes upon the States no obligation to confer upon those within their jurisdiction either the
right of free speech or the right of silence." Id. at 538. Justice Holmes wrote pre-Gitlow
opinions holding that speech could be penalized if it had a "bad tendency" on public welfare.
See Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915) (upholding punishment for an article protesting
enforcement of a ban on nude bathing as having encouraged a breach of the law); Paterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (upholding a contempt conviction for criticizing judicial behav-
ior as subsequent punishment for obstructing the administration of justice); see also Pierce v.
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involving prior restraint until 193 1,42 and not again until 1971." It took
173 years for the Supreme Court to consider the implications of state
libel laws on the first amendment." In 1967, the Court finally decided its
first privacy case involving the mass media.' 5 Eight more years passed
before the Court seriously considered the extent to which commercial
speech is entitled to first amendment protection.46
The Supreme Court's practice of hearing relatively few first amend-
ment cases and of limiting the holding of each case to the facts means
that it can directly address only a fraction of the key issues related to
freedom of speech and press. Even more frustrating are those occasions
when the Court finally has the opportunity to extend its holding to the
point where the case has some practical value for lower courts, but de-
clines to do so, preferring to postpone a decision on the matter until a
future case arises.
A. False-Light Privacy: The Missed Opportunity
No first amendment case more clearly demonstrates the problems
caused by the Court's obedience to the principle of formulating rules lim-
ited to the facts than Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.47 The Court's
failure to decide the question of the standard of liability for private per-
son plaintiffs in false-light privacy" cases has spawned contradictory
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating Oregon constitutional amendment denying
parents the right to send their children to private schools on the grounds that it interfered with
the property rights of religious schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking
down Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching of German even in private schools on the grounds
that the livelihood of those who teach German was protected by "liberty" clause of the four-
teenth amendment). Gidow followed Pierce by only one week.
42. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
43. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
44. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally R. LABUNSKI,
LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: LEGAL HISTORY AND PRACTICE IN PRINT AND
BROADCASTING (1989).
45. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). At least two states have not recognized the
tort of invasion of privacy at common law, concluding that the issue is more properly one for
legislative determination. See Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803
(1955); Kalian v. People Acting Through Community Effort, Inc., 122 R.I. 429, 432, 408 A.2d
608, 609 (1979).
46. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
47. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
48. An invasion of privacy by publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye was first identified as a distinct tort by Prosser in a well-known law review article. See
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). Prosser examined over 300 cases de-
cided in the 70 years since Warren and Brandeis originated the concept of a legal right of
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opinions in lower courts, and has virtually prevented such plaintiffs from
using false-light privacy to win compensation from news organizations.49
Cutting off those injured by irresponsible media coverage from privacy
claims, thus forcing them to sue under libel standards, increases the like-
lihood that neither plaintiff nor defendant will be treated fairly by the
process.50 If the Court had added a single sentence to its opinion in Can-
trell, one that addressed an issue that was clearly "contiguous" with al-
ready settled matters, many of the problems created by the case could
have been avoided.
In December, 1967, Margaret Cantrell's husband was killed in a
West Virginia bridge collapse. Five months later, the same reporter who
had reported on the tragedy returned to the Cantrell home to see how
Mrs. Cantrell and her four children were managing.51 The ensuing arti-
cle stressed the family's dire situation, saying that they were living in
poverty, that the children were wearing old, ill-fitting clothes, and that
the house was deteriorating.
The article gave the unmistakable impression that Mrs. Cantrell had
been interviewed, 2 although she was not at home at any time when the
reporters were there. In addition, the story misrepresented the condition
privacy in their famous article. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890). He concluded that the decisions established four independent privacy torts:
false light, intrusion upon one's solitude or seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and
appropriation. When Prosser attempted to define false-light privacy, he wrote that no clear
definition was available, but that it was "publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye." Prosser, supra, at 398. Prosser noted that the material need not be defamatory in
false-light privacy (a requirement in libel), but might well be. Id. at 400. The most typical
instances of false light are coincidental uses of names, fictionalization, distortion, embellish-
ment, and misuse of names and pictures through unfortunate juxtapositions in otherwise legiti-
mate news stories. D. GILLMOR, J. BARRON, T. SIMON & H. TERRY, MASS COMMUNICATION
LAW 314 (5th ed. 1990).
49. The status of a plaintiff, iLe., whether a public official or public figure, or private per-
son, is a key element in defamation and privacy cases. In most states, a private libel plaintiff
need prove only negligence to win a lawsuit, while a public official or public figure must prove
actual malice (knowing or reckless disregard of the truth), a much more difficult standard. See
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). For definitions of a private
person and cases allowing recovery for defamatory falsehood on a showing less strict than
actual malice, see Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v. Readers' Digest
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert
Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
50. See generally R. LABUNSKI, supra note 44. Libel suits require the investment of sub-
stantial economic resources. Pre-trial issues such as the status of the plaintiff (public official,
public figure, or private person), the standard of liability (malice, negligence, or gross negli-
gence), and the long discovery process all have the potential to make a libel suit more costly
and complicated than a privacy suit.
51. 419 U.S. at 247.
52. The article included, in part, the following statements:
Margaret Cantrell will talk neither about what happened nor about how they are
doing. She wears the same mask of non-expression she wore at the funeral. She is a
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of her home by saying the family was living in dirty and dilapidated con-
ditions.53 A jury found for Mrs. Cantrell and one of her children, hold-
ing that the newspaper had presented them in a false light, thereby
making them objects of pity and ridicule, and causing them to suffer out-
rage, mental distress, shame, and humiliation.54
The Supreme Court, with only Justice Douglas dissenting, upheld
this decision. The Court used the "actual malice" standard first formu-
lated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 5 and applied three years later
in the Court's first privacy case involving a news organization, Time, Inc.
v. Hill. 56 In Hill, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional protec-
tions for speech and press barred recovery for false reports of matters of
public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the
report with actual malice.57
The trial court judge in Cantrell followed Hill and instructed the
jury that liability could be imposed only if the newspaper had published
the article with actual malice, namely knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth. Significantly, no objection to this instruction was
made by any of the parties." The actual malice standard was erected to
proud woman. Her world has changed. She says that after it happened, the people
in town offered to help them out with money and they refused to take it.
Id. at 248 (quoting Eszterhas, Legacy of the Silver Bridge, Plain Dealer, Aug. 4, 1968 (Sun.
Magazine), at 32, col. 1).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The New York Times Court wrote as follows:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
Id. at 279-80. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
The First Amendment, " 1964 SuP. Cr. REV. 191.
56. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). The Court reversed a compensatory damage award based on the
plaintiff's complaint that a magazine had falsely reported that a new Broadway play portrayed
the plaintiff's family's experience in being held hostage by three escaped convicts.
57. Id. at 388. The Hill Court did not actually use the term "actual malice," but repeated
its definition of "knowing or reckless falsehood," according to Cantrell v. Forest City Publish-
ing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251 n.4 (1974).
58. Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 250 n.3. There was some confusion in Cantrell as to whether the
trial judge's instructions to the jury were based on New York Times actual malice, or the
common-law actual malice that is frequently expressed in terms of either personal ill-will to-
ward the plaintiff or reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights. The difference is
significant because common law malice focuses on the defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff,
while actual malice is primarily concerned with whether the defendant entertained serious
doubts as to the truthfulness of the statement, or should have had such doubts.
In Cantrell, the trial judge struck Mrs. Cantrell's demand for punitive damages, finding
that she had failed to present any evidence to support the charges that the invasion of privacy
"was done maliciously within the legal definition of that term." Id. at 251. The Court of
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give news organizations substantial "breathing space" in which to make
errors when covering newsworthy events and individuals.59 In practice,
it has proved to be a formidable obstacle to those suing news organiza-
tions. Even when reporters are guilty of serious transgressions that devi-
ate substantially from accepted journalistic practice, courts have held
that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant acted with knowing or
reckless disregard.' The standard of liability issue is significant because
plaintiffs, whether bringing defamation or privacy suits, find it nearly im-
possible to win cases where proof of actual malice,6" as opposed to negli-
gence," is required.
Only months before Cantrell was decided, the Court determined in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.63 that in defamation actions brought by pri-
vate individuals, the states could impose liability on the publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood on a "less demanding showing than
that required by New York Times."I' The practical effect of Gertz was to
enable those who are neither public officials nor public figures to recover
Appeals interpreted this to mean that there was no evidence of knowing falsity or reckless
disregard (New York Times malice) and granted respondents a directed verdict. The Supreme
Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the district judge based his deci-
sion on common law malice, rather than actual malice, and thus upheld the award on the basis
that the trial judge was "not determining that Mrs. Cantrell had failed to introduce any evi-
dence of knowing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth." Id at 252.
59. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271-72.
60. For example, in Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971), a newspaper
falsely reported that a mayor had been charged with serious crimes, when the mayor's brother
was the person actually accused. The editor assumed, without checking, that the reporter had
written the wrong first name, and because he had not heard of the brother, but only the mayor,
changed the copy. The Supreme Court overturned the jury's verdict in favor of the mayor,
holding that the rule of New York Times applies to a discussion of public officials. 401 U.S. at
299-300. See also Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Saint
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81
(1967); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
61. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (consolidated with Associ-
ated Press v. Walker), the Supreme Court unanimously held that as with public officials, public
figures must also prove actual malice. The Court, however, divided five to four in holding that
Butts, an athletic director of the University of Georgia, had been maliciously libeled by an
article in the Saturday Evening Post accusing him of providing valuable information about his
team's strategy to the opposing coach in an important football game. The court awarded Butts
$460,000 in damages. 388 U.S. at 138.
62. The negligence test may be broadly described as permitting recovery on a showing
that in publishing a defamatory falsehood the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have known, that the statement was false or would create a false impression in
some material respect. See Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio
App. 2d 105, 110, 334 N.E.2d 494, 498 (1974); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d
439, 445, 546 P.2d 81, 85 (1976).
63. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
64. Id. at 348.
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in defamation actions on a showing of mere negligence, a significantly
easier standard to meet than actual malice.65
Mrs. Cantrell was indisputably a private person for purposes of her
suit. She had not sought notoriety by injecting herself into a public con-
troversy as required by Supreme Court defamation cases.66 Because of
the many similarities between defamation and false-light privacy,67 the
Court could well have applied the Gertz standard to Cantrell, thus al-
lowing private plaintiffs bringing false-light privacy suits to prove
whatever standard was formulated by the jurisdiction for defamation ac-
tions.68 Such an extension seems all the more logical when one considers
that negligence is subsumed under malice: By proving malice, Mrs. Can-
trell demonstrated that the newspaper was negligent.
The Supreme Court, however, never reached that issue. It con-
cluded that the reporter in Cantrell must have known that a number of
the statements in the article contained "calculated falsehoods," justifying
the jury's conclusion that he had portrayed the Cantrells in a false light
through "knowing or reckless untruth. '69
65. See Labunski, supra note 15, at 100 n.56.
66. The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403
U.S. 29, 52 (1971), adopted the "public interest" test from Hill requiring that, in addition to
public officials and public figures, private individuals involved in matters of public interest
would also have to prove actual malice. The Rosenbloom Court focused on the status of the
issue (whether it was a matter of legitimate public interest) rather than the actions of the
plaintiff (whether the plaintiff had voluntarily become involved in a public controversy). Id. at
43-45. The Supreme Court jettisoned the Rosenbloom public interest test in its opinion in
Gertz, creating instead a public figure/private person test that turns on the status of the plain-
tiff, not the nature of the issue. Then, in Cantrell, the Court effectively applied the Hill/
Rosenbloom public interest test to false-light privacy cases involving private persons involved
in matters of public interest, largely ignoring the public figure/private person test in Gertz
67. Both defamation and false-light privacy require proof that the matter publicized is
false. In both causes of action, a court should consider the context in which the statement was
made. Several jurisdictions, including Arkansas and Kentucky, allow a plaintiff to bring defa-
mation and privacy actions based on the same facts.
68. This is what New York did in Fils-Aime v. Enlightenment Press, Inc., 133 Misc. 2d
559, 507 N.Y.S.2d 947 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), wherein the court recognized the similarity of
issues raised in defamation and privacy claims, holding that the standard of care applicable to
a private plaintiff in a defamation action should determine a media defendant's liability in a
privacy action.
69. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253 (1974). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Cantrell v. Forest City Pub-
lishing Co., 484 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 419 U.S. 245 (1974):
Although Mrs. Cantrell and her son were displeased with the article published by the
Plain Dealer and the article was not as carefully written as it should have been, nev-
ertheless there was no proof that the [newspaper] printed and distributed the article
with any knowledge of the falsities contained in it or in reckless disregard of whether
or not it was true.... The failure of the defendant.., to verify the factual assertions
in the story is not condoned, but there was no evidence of calculated falsehood.
484 F.2d at 157. The Supreme Court avoided the issue of what a private person plaintiff must
prove in another privacy case, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), by hold-
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There is much irony in Mrs. Cantrell's success in overcoming the
actual malice barrier. If Mrs. Cantrell had been able to prove only negli-
gence, it is likely that the Supreme Court would have applied the lower
standard of Gertz to her case. Therefore, the Court is mistaken when it
says that Cantrell presented no occasion on which to apply Gertz. It
actually presented the only opportunity the Court has had to make that
logical determination. Because she was able to prove actual malice, the
Supreme Court found that the facts of Cantrell did not require a decision
on the applicability of Gertz:
[T]his case presents no occasion to consider whether a State may con-
stitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of liability for a publisher
or broadcaster of false statements injurious to a private individual
under a false-light theory of invasion of privacy, or whether the consti-
tutional standard announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to all false-
light cases.70
The failure to extend Gertz to Cantrell has created widespread con-
fusion in lower courts. The standard applied in private person false-light
privacy cases varies not only from one state to another, but sometimes
within the same state. Judges attempting to reconcile Gertz and Cantrell
have had to speculate as to the standard the Supreme Court would have
imposed if it had used Cantrell to apply Gertz to private person false-light
privacy cases. 71 The result is that no national standard exists for balanc-
ing the conflicting, but nevertheless compelling, interests of news organi-
zations to publish information about individuals and the rights of private
ing that a television station could broadcast information (the name of a rape and murder vic-
tim) legally obtained from a public record. 420 U.S. at 487-97. The essence of a false-light
privacy claim is that the "matter published is not true," and is such "a major misrepresenta-
tion of his character, history, activities or beliefs that serious offense may reasonably be ex-
pected to be taken by a reasonable man in his position." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652E comments a, c (1977).
70. Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 250-51. The Court added the following sentence: "Rather, the
sole question that we need decide is whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the
jury's verdict." Id. at 251. The Court's analysis centered on whether the trial judge had in-
structed the jury under the constitutional malice standard brought forward from New York
Times to Hill, or whether the instructions centered on common-law malice, which differs from
the federal constitutional standard. The Court concluded that the district judge was fully
aware that the Hill meaning of the New York Times standard had to be satisfied for the Can-
trells to recover damages and was correct in finding that the actual malice standard had been
met. Id. at 252. The trial judge had dismissed the punitive damages claim.
71. A typical statement recognizing the inconsistency between Hill and Gertz was made
by the Kentucky Supreme Court in McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d
882 (Ky. 1981):
Whether Gertz will be used to modify Time, Inc. v. Hill is only speculation. Until the
Supreme Court has spoken, we must comply with the ruling in Hill, and recovery is
predicated on the standards set therein. In the event the Gertz rule is applied, we
believe the desirable standard of fault is that of simple negligence which we have
adopted in this opinion for libel cases.
Id. at 888.
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persons to be compensated for harm caused by irresponsible reporting.
After sixteen years, there is still no federal constitutional rule establish-
ing the standard for such cases.
B. After Cantrell: Inconsistency in Applying Hill to Private Person
Plaintiffs
The restraint exercised by the Supreme Court in Cantrell has al-
lowed lower courts wide discretion to determine the standard of liability
for false-light privacy plaintiffs.
Courts in a number of states have obediently applied Hill by requir-
ing private person plaintiffs to prove actual malice.72 Other courts seem-
ingly adopt Hill's actual malice standard for false-light privacy cases
without actually saying so.' 3 Still other courts have applied the actual
malice standard by adopting the Restatement rule that a false-light inva-
sion occurs if "(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge
of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter
and the false light in which the other would be placed." 74 Clearly, the
second arm of this test represents the actual malice standard, and juris-
dictions which use the Restatement rule are effectively following Hill.75
Several courts have expressed reluctance in applying Hill, but obediently
follow the Supreme Court's lead.76
72. See generally Fellows v. National Inquirer, 42 Cal. 3d 234, 721 P.2d 97, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 215 (1986); McCammon & Assoc. v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 716 P.2d 490
(Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Colbert v. World Publishing Co., 747 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1987); Lorentz v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
73. See Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Corp., 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (im-
plicitly recognizing actual malice standard for private person plaintiffs in false-light privacy
cases despite denying defendant's motion for summary dismissal); Uhl v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., 476 F. Supp. 1134 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that invasion of privacy claims are
subject to the constitutional standard set out in New York Times, but adding that for false-light
cases, actual malice must be distinguished from common law malice, based on Cantrell v.
Forest City Publishing Co.).
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). See infra note 75 for cita-
tions to courts that have followed the Restatement rule.
75. See generally Dempsey v. National Enquirer, 687 F. Supp. 692 (D. Me. 1988);
Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, 510 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.J. 1981); Goodrich v. Waterbury Repub-
lican-American, 188 Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982); Prescott v. Bay St. Louis Newspapers,
497 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 1986); Dean v. Guard Publishing Co., 88 Or. App. 192, 744 P.2d 1296
(1987).
76. See Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980) ("The [Supreme Court] consciously abstained from examining
the status of [Hill] in light of [Gertz]. It is the duty of this court to follow the mandate of
[Hill] until the rule announced therein has been modified or overruled." Id. at 639 n.9, 590
S.W.2d at 845 n.9); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Ky.
1981) (recognizing the differing standards of liability as a "gray area," but holding, neverthe-
less, that "[u]ntil the Supreme Court has spoken, we must comply with the ruling in Hill").
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Where defamation and privacy actions can arise from the same
facts, as in Kentucky" and Arkansas,7" inconsistent standards of liability
are especially troublesome, confounding logic and rationality. On a prac-
tical level, the differing standards provide a tangible incentive for private
plaintiffs to file defamation actions rather than privacy actions.
A second group of jurisdictions has not yet considered whether pri-
vate plaintiffs in privacy cases should prove negligence or actual malice,
but have applied the Hill rule in cases involving public figures.79
A third group of jurisdictions may be deemed "rebellious," having
rejected the Hill rule by allowing private person plaintiffs in false-light
privacy cases to recover upon a showing of negligence.8 0 Courts in these
jurisdictions have concluded that the Supreme Court will follow their
lead and apply Gertz to false-light privacy when it has the opportunity.
A typical approach of the "rebellious" jurisdictions was stated by Judge
Green in Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co. 81
Although the Supreme Court has had no occasion to decide the mat-
ter, no reason appears to distinguish false light invasion of privacy ac-
tions from defamation actions in this regard. Since the District of
Columbia applies a negligence standard to defamation actions involv-
ing private individuals, that standard should also be applied to a false
light action.8
2
Some courts brazenly predict the future ruling of the Supreme Court
on the issue. For example, a federal court in Kansas held that "because
of the strong similarity between a false light claim and a defamation
claim, the Gertz rule will replace the Hill rule in the area of false-light
privacy."8 3 Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals con-
cluded as follows:
77. See McCall, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981).
78. See Dodrill, 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840. Arkansas, however, allows only one re-
covery for any particular publication.
79. These jurisdictions include Tennessee, Washington, and the Second and Fourth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals. See Machleder v. WCBS-TV, 801 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986); Fitzgerald v.
Penthouse Int'l, 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982); Roberts v. Dover, 525 F. Supp. 987 (M.D.
Tenn. 1981); Hoppe v. Hearst Corp., 106 Wash. 2d 466, 722 P.2d 1295 (1986).
80. These jurisdictions include the District of Columbia, Kansas, Michigan, West Vir-
ginia, New York, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245
(5th Cir. 1984); Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984); Dresbach v.
Doubleday, 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981); Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan.
1977), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1983); Deitz v. Wometco West Michigan TV, 160
Mich. App. 367, 407 N.W.2d 649 (1987); Fils-Aime v. Enlightenment Press, Inc., 133 Misc. 2d
559, 507 N.Y.S. 947 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (requiring a showing of gross negligence for private
person plaintiffs in both false light privacy and defamation claims); Crump v. Beckley Newspa-
pers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1984).
81. 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981).
82. Id. at 1288.
83. Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 854-56 (D. Kan. 1977), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1304,
1307 (10th Cir. 1983). It is interesting to note that the court relied in large measure on the
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Due to the pronounced overlap of defamation and false light invasion
of privacy, particularly in the area of their first amendment implica-
tions, we conclude that the existing inconsistency between Hill and
Gertz will eventually be resolved in favor of Gertz. In the absence of a
privileged communication, the test to be applied in a false light inva-
sion of privacy action by a private individual against a media defend-
ant is what a reasonably prudent person would have done under the
same or similar circumstances."4
Perhaps most influential of these "rebellious" jurisdictions is the
Fifth Circuit, which has made two rulings that negligence is the standard
in false-light privacy cases.8 5 In the most recent case, the court noted
that applicable state law was silent on the standard of care applicable to
publishers in false-light privacy actions."6 Furthermore, it noted that the
authority of Hill had been undermined by Gertz. 87 It concluded,
[W]e hold that Gertz applies equally to false-light and defamation
cases, and that states are permitted, consistent with the [flirst and
[f]ourteenth [a]mendments, to impose liability for actual damages on
publishers who negligently place private figures in an offensive light.88
This holding seems to conflict with the Fourth Circuit's view that the
actual malice standard would apply and clearly controverts the numer-
ous state court rulings that Hill is applicable.
Finally, several courts remain unconvinced that false-light privacy
constitutes a distinct cause of action and have held that defamation stan-
dards suffice.89 The North Carolina Supreme Court, in strongly rejecting
similarity between Dr. Rinsley and Ronald Hutchinson, who later became a plaintiff in an
important Supreme Court libel case. In Rinsley, the court noted that he had been on the staff
of a children's hospital, while Hutchinson was the director of research at a state hospital.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1327 (W.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th
Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). Two years later, the Supreme Court held that Hutchin-
son was a private person for the purpose of his defamation suit against Senator William
Proxmire, who gave Hutchinson a "golden fleece" award for allegedly wasting taxpayer
money. See generally Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Dresbach v. Doubleday,
518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981).
84. Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 89 (W. Va. 1984).
85. Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff who performed an
act with a pig in an amusement park swimming pool was a private figure and need only prove
negligence against a men's magazine which published her picture); Wood v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a woman who posed nude for a picture taken
by her husband that was later stolen by a neighbor and published in a men's magazine was a
private person for purposes of a false-light privacy action and had to prove negligence).
86. Wood, 736 F.2d at 1091.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1092.
89. See generally Angelotta v. American Broadcasting Corp., 820 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.
1987) (holding that state law expressly did not recognize false-light privacy as a separate cause
of action); Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., 709 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1986) (holding that
state law did not recognize the tort of false light and that differences between it and defamation
were largely "semantic"); Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 312
S.E.2d 405 (1984), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 858 (1984). This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. It
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recognition of false-light privacy, is representative of these jurisdictions.
The court determined that libel and privacy are so similar that to allow
false-light privacy would either "duplicate an existing right of recovery
for libel or slander or involve a good deal of overlapping with such
rights."9 Moreover, the court held that allowing such recovery would
"tend to add to the tension already existing between the [flirst
[a]mendment and the law of torts in cases of this nature."9
III
Manipulation of the Common Law: Justification for
Contiguous Decision-Making
Courts have much in common with parents who tell their children,
"Do as I say, not as I do," in trying to dissuade their offspring from
inappropriate behavior. Significant portions of judicial opinions are de-
voted to reminding the reader that courts are governed by strict rules,
two of the most important being that precedents will be binding on the
present case and that the holding will extend no further than the facts
require. If case-by-case development of the common law is to provide
identifiable rules, it is important that courts adhere to the principles of
previous cases even when they do not accept them as persuasive.
What courts say and what they do, however, are not always the
same. The common law's flexibility is one of its great virtues, but it is
subject to manipulation by judges determined to reach a certain result,
who then identify precedents and principles that justify the conclusion.
All too often courts creatively sidestep their oft-stated principles by
either ignoring precedents they find inconvenient or by giving the present
case a spin that the most gifted contortionist would envy.
demonstrates the disparate approaches that lower courts have taken in reaction to Gertz and
Cantrell. North Carolina could be added to the list of states that have reluctantly applied Hill.
Although it specifically does not recognize false light invasion of privacy, it impliedly held that
Hill would govern.
90. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 323, 312 S.E.2d at 412. The court implied that if it accepted
false-light privacy, it would require New York Times actual malice:
Given the first amendment limitations placed upon defamation actions by [New York
Times] and upon false light invasion of privacy actions by Hill, we think that such
additional remedies as we might be required to make available to plaintiffs should we
recognize false light invasion of privacy claims are not sufficient to justify the recog-
nition in this jurisdiction of such inherently constitutionally suspect claims for relief.
Id. at 326, 312 S.E.2d at 413 (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 323, 312 S.E.2d at 412. See Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15
VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962) (expressing concern over whether false light invasion of privacy
would overwhelm existing laws of libel and slander); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)
(suggesting that libel and privacy actions are similar and many of the same considerations
apply to each type of claim).
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In short, courts frequently break the rules they have created. When
interpreting the Constitution, judges at times seem more like robed legis-
lators than jurists as they substitute their judgment for that of the other
branches of government.92 If courts historically had been more forth-
coming about the violation of such rules, and acknowledged that consti-
tutional interpretation involves substantial discretion, the proposal in this
Article to grant them limited authority to go beyond the facts of a case
would not be considered a controversial enlargement of judicial power.
A. Judicial Legislating in Lochner: Ignoring a Precedent
From Blackstone to the present day, courts have claimed allegiance
to the principle that they are bound by authoritative precedents, regard-
less of their feelings about the soundness of the judgment made in previ-
ous cases. It is widely believed that allowing judges to ignore or
circumvent relevant precedents jeopardizes the fragile legitimacy that
courts need to function.
Numerous examples could be cited where the Supreme Court simply
pretended that authoritative precedents did not exist. One of the most
famous examples, in a non-first amendment case, illustrates judges' will-
ingness to violate common-law rules in a way that is perhaps more egre-
gious than any that would be available under the contiguous decision-
making proposal offered in this Article.
Lochner v. New York 93 represents one of the Court's boldest efforts
to use the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to protect
business. At issue was a New York law limiting bakery employees' hours
to ten per day or sixty per week. The Court invalidated the law, reason-
ing that the right to make a contract "is part of the liberty of the individ-
ual protected by the [flourteenth [a]mendment," and that no state can
deprive any person of such liberty without "due process of law."94
The Court recognized that it had approved laws limiting the number
of hours that coal miners could work95 and requiring compulsory vacci-
nation.96 Nevertheless, it held that the work done by a baker, "in and of
92. See generally R. BORK, supra note 3; L. TRIBE, supra note 8; B. SIEGAN, THE
SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTION (1987).
93. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Rehnquist calls Lochner "one of the most ill-starred decisions"
that the Supreme court ever rendered. W. REHNQUIST, supra ,note 3, at 205. See also
Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
94. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. See S. NoviCK, supra note 7, at 280-82, 290. The same
argument was used numerous times between 1887 and 1937 to invalidate state and federal laws
that protected individuals in their work environment, wages, and other areas.
95. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
96. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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itself, is not an unhealthy one to the degree which would authorize the
legislature to interfere with the right to labor, and with the right of free
contract on the part of the individual, either as employer or employee." 97
A more stark perversion of the purposes of the amendment than Lochner
likely does not exist.
For this reason, perhaps, the Court felt compelled to address the
issue of judicial "legislating" as follows:
This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the court for that
of the legislature. If the act be within the power of the State it is valid,
although the judgment of the court might be totally opposed to the
enactment of such a law .... There is no reasonable ground for inter-
fering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by deter-
mining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.98
In what may be the Supreme Court's most callous analogy, it suggested
that if it allowed New York to limit the hours of bakers, the states would
then want to legislate the hours and conditions of those working in
banks, law firms, real estate, and other companies if there are complaints
about the lack of sunlight in their office buildings.99
Justice Holmes, in one of his most famous dissents, wrote that "a
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,"lco
and further argued that such a law should be upheld if there is any rea-
sonable basis for it:
I think the word liberty in the (flourteenth [a]mendment is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion,
unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would
admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles
as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our
law .... A reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the
score of health. 0 1
97. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.
98. Id. at 56-57.
99. The Court wrote that "[n]o trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one's living,
could escape this all-pervading power... of the legislature." Id at 59-60. The Court further
wrote as follows:
In our large cities there are many buildings into which the sun penetrates for but a
short time in each day .... Upon the assumption of validity of this act under review,
it is not possible to say that an act, prohibiting lawyers or bank clerks, or others,
from contracting to labor for their employers more than eight hours a day would be
invalid.
Id.
100. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan more directly chastised the Court
for legislating as follows:
No evils arising from such legislation could be more far-reaching than those that
might come to our system of government if the judiciary, abandoning the sphere
assigned to it by the fundamental law, should enter the domain of legislation, and
upon grounds merely of justice or reason or wisdom annul statutes that had received
the sanction of the people's representatives.
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Lochner set a precedent that seemed hard to ignore. Yet three years
after Lochner, the Court in Muller v. Oregon '02 unanimously upheld an
Oregon law that limited the number of hours women could work in "any
mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry." The Court rejected
arguments that Lochner was controlling, saying "this assumes that the
difference between the sexes does not justify a different rule respecting a
restriction of the hours of labor."'' 3
Lochner was further undermined, if not overruled, in Bunting v. Or-
egon, 0 when the Court approved an Oregon law establishing a ten-hour
maximum workday for both men and women.'° 5 Remarkably, Bunting
does not even mention Lochner. The Court seemed to adopt Holmes'
"reasonable man" theory from his Lochner dissent: "It is enough for our
decision if the legislation under review was passed in the exercise of any
admitted power of government."'' 0 6
Muller and Bunting suggested that Lochner had lost much of its
authority, and Bunting's failure to even mention Lochner led some to
believe it had been overruled. That made the Court's invalidation of a
minimum wage law for women in Adkins v. Children's Hospital'07 all the
more surprising.
In Adkins, the Court unabashedly upheld the freedom of contract
under the fourteenth amendment without expressing any concern for the
special needs of women. The Court ruled that the statute was "simply
and exclusively a price-fixing law, confined to adult women ... who are
legally as capable of contracting for themselves as men."' 08 Refusing to
consider the setting of minimum wages to be similar to the setting of
hours, the Court held that the statute violated the Constitution and that
invalidating such a law is "a plain exercise of the judicial power."" The
Court tried to argue that it was not invalidating the law on "substantive"
grounds, but was instead merely rejecting an "inferior act of legislation,"
which, by conflicting with the Constitution, "is of no effect, and binding
on no one."
110
Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
102. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
103. Id. at 419.
104. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
105. The statute, thought to include bakeries, read in part: "No person shall be employed
in any mill, factory or manufacturing establishment in this state more than ten hours in any
one day." Id. at 433-34. The law provided several exceptions, such as allowing overtime not
to exceed three hours in any one day, unless the wages were paid at time and a half.
106. Bunting, 243 U.S. at 437.
107. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
108. Id. at 554.
109. Id. at 544.
110. Id. The Court denied it was exercising arbitrary powers:
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Chief Justice Taft argued in dissent that Muller was controlling, see-
ing no difference between regulating maximum hours and minimum
wages. 1I' Taft recognized that the Court in Bunting had sustained a law
limiting the hours of any person working in any mill or factory or manu-
facturing establishment, without mentioning Lochner. 2  He criticized
the confusion the Court had created, concluding that there is no "consti-
tutional distinction between employment in a bakery and one in any
other kind of manufacturing establishment which should make a limit of
hours in the one invalid, and the same limit in the other permissible."' 1 3
Unable to reconcile Bunting and Lochner, Taft stated, "I have always
supposed that the Lochner case was thus overruled sub silentio."
4
B. Manipulating the Common Law to Gather Votes
The Supreme Court may also ignore precedents in order to avoid
offending members of the Court whose votes are needed in a particular
case. This form of manipulation of the common law demonstrates the
lengths to which the Court will reach in order to achieve certain ends.
A case in point is Grovey v. Townsend, 1 15 where the Court held that
party primaries were outside the protection of the Constitution. The case
arose when a county clerk refused to give a black voter a ballot in the
Texas Democratic primary. Justice Roberts wrote for the Court that
political parties could determine their own membership and were volun-
tary associations, holding that the legislature "has never attempted to
prescribe or to limit the membership of a political party, and it is now
settled that it has no power so to do."' 6
The Court further rejected arguments that, since the Democratic
party dominated state politics, and the winner of the primary almost al-
This is not the exercise of a substantive power to review and nullify acts of Congress,
for no such substantive power exists. It is simply a necessary concomitant of the
power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the
determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law.
Id.
111. Id. at 563 (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 563.
113. Id. at 564.
114. Id. Holmes, in dissent, expressed some misgivings about the law, but they were irrele-
vant according to his standard of judicial review: "When so many intelligent persons have
studied the matter more than any of us can .... it seems to me impossible to deny the belief
reasonably may be held by reasonable men." Id. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See
Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (the four surviving members of the Adkins majority
joined with Justice Roberts to invalidate a New York law that attempted to add a "value of
service" feature to a minimum wage law); see also Morehead, 298 U.S. at 631 (Stone, J., dis-
senting). See generally Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 311 (1955).
115. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
116. Id. at 52-53.
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ways was elected in the general election, blacks could not be prevented
from participating in the primary. The Court determined that this would
"confuse the privilege of membership in a party with the right'to vote for
one who is to hold public office.""' 7
Six years later, Justice Stone needed Justice Roberts' vote in US. v.
Classic, 11 which held that federal primary elections were subject to con-
gressional regulation. He avoided offending Roberts by deliberately
omitting any reference to Grovey. In directly refuting the holding in
Grovey, Stone found that the primary was an integral part of choosing a
member of Congress, and "the right of qualified voters to vote at the
congressional primary . . . is thus the right to participate in that
choice."' '
Three years later, in Smith v. Allwright, Election Judge,'20 Stone no
longer needed Roberts' vote and held that Grovey had been dead ever
since Classic. Smith, like Grovey, involved the exclusionary practice of
denying blacks the right to vote in primaries. Holding that such a prac-
tice violates the fourteenth amendment, the Court vindicated Classic: "It
may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in such a primary
... is a right secured by the Constitution."'' This provoked an angry
protest from Justice Roberts:
If this court's opinion in the Classic case discloses its method of over-
ruling earlier decisions, I can only protest that, in fairness, it should
rather have adopted the open and frank way of saying what it was
doing than, after the event, characterizing its past action as overruling
Grove v. Townsend though those less sapient never realized the
fact. 2
117. Id. at 54-55; see also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536 (1927).
118. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
119. Id. at 314. The Court concluded that, "The right of voters at the primary to have
their vote counted is ... a right or privilege secured by the Constitution." Id at 325.
120. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
121. Id. at 661-62. The Court added, "In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful
of the desirability of continuity of decision in constitutional questions. However, when con-
vinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.... Grovey v.
Townsend is overruled." Id. at 665-66 (footnote omitted).
122. Id. at 670 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Roberts added,
It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era whose greatest
need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this court, which has been looked to as
exhibiting consistency in adjudication .... should now itself become the breeder of
fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our institutions.
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C. Manipulating the Common Law: When Dicta Become Holding
Near v. Minnesota 123 was the Supreme Court's first important an-
ticensorship decision. A closely divided Court held unconstitutional a
law that provided for the abating, as a public nuisance, of "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory" newspapers or periodicals and the enjoining
of anyone maintaining such a nuisance. 24 With reference to the writings
of Blackstone and the history of the first amendment, Chief Justice
Hughes concluded that freedom of the press prohibited prior restraint in
all but exceptional cases.' 25 After quoting Holmes in Schenck v. United
States 126 to the effect that the first amendment may be interpreted differ-
ently during war as opposed to peace, Hughes wrote as follows:
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of sailing dates
of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar
grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against
obscene publications. The security of the community life may be pro-
tected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by
force of orderly government. The constitutional guaranty of free
speech does not protect a man from an injunction against uttering
words that may have all the effect of force. These limitations are not
applicable here.
127
Both the Hughes and Holmes statements are clearly dicta. They
were not necessary to deciding that the Minnesota statute allowing such
an injunction against a publisher is an unconstitutional prior restraint.
There was no need for Hughes to describe the circumstances under
which prior restraint would be constitutional. Nevertheless, those words
became the standard by which a subsequent prior restraint case was
decided. 12
Four decades after Near, the Supreme Court had to determine
whether injunctions issued against the Washington Post and the New
123. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
124. Id. at 701-02 (Hughes, J., writing for the court).
125. Quoting Blackstone, the Court held as follows:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this con-
sists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from cen-
sure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the
freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he
must take the consequences of his own temerity.
Id at 713-14 (emphasis in original).
126. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Holmes wrote, "When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any consti-
tutional right." Id. (Holmes, J., writing for the court).
127. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (Hughes, J., writing for the Court).
128. See United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), dismissed 610
F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
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York Times, preventing them from further publishing the Pentagon Pa-
pers, were unconstitutional prior restraints. In New York Times Co. v.
United States, 129 the Court in a per curiam opinion overturned the in-
junctions against the newspapers. Several concurring opinions inter-
preted Near as having repudiated the argument that the government has
inherent powers to obtain an injunction to protect the national
interest. 130
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, went even further in
treating the dicta in Near as authoritative. After quoting Holmes'
Schenck opinion, which was cited in Near, Brennan observed the
following:
Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tantamount to
a time of war, or if the power of presently available armaments would
justify even in peacetime the suppression of information that would set
in motion a nuclear holocaust, in neither of these actions has the Gov-
ernment presented or even alleged that publication of items from or
based upon the material at issue would cause the happening of an event
of that nature. 
13 1
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger did not treat the Near dicta as au-
thoritative. After stating that the first amendment was not absolute, and
referring to Holmes' aphorism concerning the right to shout "fire" in a
crowded theatre, Burger wrote, "There are other exceptions, some of
which Chief Justice Hughes mentioned by way of example in Near v.
Minnesota." 
132
Burger's "by way of example" statement in New York Times be-
came the ratio decidendi by which a federal district court less than a
decade later granted an injunction against a magazine that wanted to
publish an article detailing how to make a hydrogen bomb. In United
States v. Progressive, 133 Judge Warren carefully traced the development
of the first amendment, and its implications for prior restraint. In that
opinion, Judge Warren completed the transformation of Near's dicta into
authoritative holding, stating as follows:
In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court specifically recognized
an extremely narrow area, involving national security, in which inter-
ference with [f]irst [a]mendment rights might be tolerated and a prior
restraint on publication might be appropriate....
129. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415
(1971).
130. 403 U.S. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 749 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger added, "There are no doubt other excep-
tions no one has had occasion to describe or discuss. Conceivably such exceptions may be
lurking in these cases and would have been flushed out had they been properly considered in
the trial courts, free from unwarranted deadlines and frenetic pressures." Id.
133. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
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... [I]t is clear that few things, save grave national security con-
cerns, are sufficient to override [flirst [a]mendment interests.
... [T]his Court concludes that publication of the technical infor-
mation on the hydrogen bomb contained in the article is analogous to
publication of troop movements or locations in time of war and falls
within the extremely narrow exception to the rule against prior
restraint. 134
What began as dicta in 1931 thus became the ratio decidendi by
which Progressive was decided. Even more importantly, this half-century
old dicta has become the constitutional standard by which exceptions to
the prior restraint rule are judged.
IV
Creating the Principle of "Contiguous Decision-
Making" and Applying It to False-Light
Privacy
As the above discussion has demonstrated, granting courts the au-
thority to extend the holding of a case beyond the facts in first amend-
ment cases would not be a radical departure from present practice. The
difference will be that judges will specifically identify sections of an opin-
ion that are not essential to the court's holding but will nevertheless have
the force of law.
Creating the principle of "contiguous decision-making" and apply-
ing it to first amendment cases faces several obstacles. But despite the
problems, such a principle may be required when the alternative is an
interminable delay in settling important first amendment issues. The
principle can be carefully applied and will thus not fundamentally
change the authority that courts now exercise.
A. Cases and Controversies
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is constitutionally limited to
"cases" and "controversies."' 35 The courts will not exert their power
and risk their prestige to answer hypothetical, academic, or abstract
questions or to hand down a decision where a judgment can have no
practical effect.136 The requirement of a case or controversy is also cited
by judges as a reason for refusing to give advisory opinions. The Court
134. Id. at 992, 996 (Warren, J., writing for the Court) (citations omitted). Judge Warren
understood the unprecedented nature of his decision. He noted that the injunction "consti-
tute[d] the first instance of a prior restraint against a publication in this fashion in the history
of this Country," but he concluded that the government had met its heavy burden. Id. at 996.
135. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
136. W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHETT, supra note 5, at 183.
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has, nevertheless, occasionally offered such opinions in the form of
dicta. 1
37
Allowing courts to extend the holding of a case beyond the facts is
not a violation of the cases and controversies clause. Such action is not
an advisory opinion in which another branch of government or litigants
ask the court what they should do in order to win eventual court ap-
proval. It is also not a declaratory judgment action, sometimes confused
with advisory opinions.' 31
Contiguous decision-making would also not constitute "friendly
suits" in which the interests of the opposing parties are actually not ad-
verse, 139 or "test cases" which have been so carefully engineered for judi-
cial review that the Supreme Court will refuse to accept them. " It
would also not have any effect on the issue of standing.14'
137. See Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68 (1922) (holding that a federal law regulating
transactions in grain futures was unconstitutional but suggesting that Congress pass a new law
based on evidence that there is direct interference with interstate commerce). The new law,
Grain Futures Act, was upheld in Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). In Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Court held that an admission policy that
reserved a fixed number of places for minorities at the UC Davis Medical School was unconsti-
tutional. 438 U.S. at 320. Justice Powell indicated that the kind of affirmative action program
used at Harvard University was constitutionally acceptable. Id. at 316-18.
138. In 1934, Congress passed the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act authorizing the fed-
eral courts to declare rights and other legal relations in cases of "actual controversy," and
providing that such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and
be reviewable as such. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988). The act was upheld in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Public
Affairs Assocs. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111 (1962).
139. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288
(1936), the Court declined to permit constitutional issues to be raised by the device of stock-
holders' suits.
140. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (holding that no actual controversy
existed between federal government and Cherokee Indians over land rights). But see Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (stating that an actual controversy
did exist over efforts to deport an alien).
141. The Court has historically required that in order to establish standing, the interests of
the parties must be personal and not shared with all other citizens generally, and that the
interest being defended is a legally protected interest, or right, which is immediately threatened
by government action. See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) (denying stand-
ing to power company to enjoin Public Works Administration from building municipal power
systems competing with the private company); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)
(denying a taxpayer standing to seek enjoining of congressional statute providing grants to
states for infant mortality programs); see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (denying right of group to
challenge transfer of Army hospital to a religious college for no compensation); Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (denying standing to group challenging zoning ordinance); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (holding that group lacked standing to force the
secretary of the treasury to publish the budget of the CIA); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (denying citizens' group suit against members of Congress
who hold commissions in the Armed Forces Reserves); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
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B. Briefing on Contiguous Issues
It is widely accepted that courts can only rule on points that have
been specifically argued by the opposing parties. It is assumed that the
clash of opposing arguments will expose courts to all relevant issues and
lead to fair and just decisions. This view makes many assumptions, in-
cluding that the opposing sides are equally capable, in terms of financial
and intellectual resources, to argue their case.
Under contiguous decision-making, a court would initially receive
traditional briefs asking it to formulate a rule based on the facts. Oppos-
ing counsel would also prepare and submit briefs on "contiguous" issues
that are closely related to previously settled matters, and are relevant to
the facts of the present case, but are not directly based on them. The
second briefs will be submitted before oral argument so the court can
explore with the opposing attorneys just how far beyond the facts it
should venture. The court would then be informed not only of issues
directly emanating from the facts, but also of those based on contiguous
principles.
C. Writing Opinions
Under current procedure, portions of the opinion not based directly
on the facts are rarely specifically identified as such. Contiguous deci-
sion-making would help identify those parts of the cases that are dicta,
and those that are ratio decidend.
Judges in appellate courts may want to take one vote on sections
dealing with the facts and holding, and another vote on peripheral issues.
The opinion would then be divided into two portions, each having prece-
dential value.'42 The advantage is that lower courts and litigants will
(1972) (denying standing to Sierra Club to challenge proposed ski resort); Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1 (1972) (denying standing to plaintiffs challenging Army's surveillance program of civil-
ian political activities). But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (upholding taxpayer's right
to sue to test grants to religious schools); Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968)
(allowing utility company that had virtual monopoly to challenge Tennessee Valley Authority
plan to offer cheaper power); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (upholding standing of
Kansas state senators to bring suit over tie-breaking vote of lieutenant governor); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (upholding standing for religious school challenging
Oregon law requiring children to be sent to public schools); but see also United States v. Stu-
dents Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (upholding right to sue
of group challenging the Interstate Commerce Commission policy that interfered with re-
cycling operations); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (holding that white man challenging
the exclusion of blacks from the grand jury had standing); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953) (upholding standing of California property owner who broke racially restrictive
covenant).
142. This system may seem cumbersome, but it cannot be worse than the undermining of
judicial authority that takes place when lower courts virtually ignore majority Supreme Court
opinions, and openly adopt the standards formulated in the dissent. See, e.g., cases rejecting or
1990)
know not only the standards emanating from the facts, but also the
court's interpretation of the Constitution on related issues.
D. Applying "Contiguous Decision-Making" to False-Light Privacy
The purpose of contiguous decision-making is not to grant the judi-
ciary unbridled authority to act as a "super-legislature" by substituting
the courts' judgment on first amendment issues for those of the people
through their elected representatives. As has been demonstrated, the
courts already have ample authority to do so if they choose. Nor does
this allow judges the authority to ignore relevant precedent and write
their own opinions into law. This proposed decision-making authority is
no more unsettling to the legal system than are currently-existing manip-
ulations of the common law, such as ignoring precedents and transform-
ing dicta into ratio decidendi. "I
Contiguous decision-making would be based on several principles:
1) Contiguous decision-making will be limited to first amendment cases or
those which materially affect freedom of speech and press.
False-light privacy clearly falls within the category of cases involv-
ing first amendment freedoms. Freedom of speech and press are essential
if a democratic society is to function and have been placed in a "pre-
ferred position" in relation to other constitutional rights. The liability of
news organizations in defamation and invasion of privacy suits directly
affects their ability to disseminate information and is among the most
urgent of first amendment concerns.
44
2) Contiguous decision-making will extend the holding of a case beyond the
facts only if a precedent has laid the groundwork for such an
extension.
Requiring contiguous decision-making to be based on a relevant pre-
cedent gives it the "contiguous" quality. It is merely the extending of the
distinguishing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), and essentially adopting the dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Stewart: LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); McGraw-Hill v. Arizona, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982);
Riley v. Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433
(10th Cir. 1977); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973);
State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wash. 2d 749, 689 P.2d 392 (1984); Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98
Wash. 2d 638, 658 P.2d 641 (1983); Senear v. Daily Journal Am., 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d
1180 (1982).
143. For discussions of Lochner, Grovey, Near, and Progressive, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 93-101, 115-22, 123-25, and 133-34, respectively.
144. See generally R. LABUNSKI, supra note 44; R. BEZANSON, supra note 23; R. SMOLLA,
SUING THE PRESS (1986).
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holding into an area that is a direct outgrowth of an already settled area
of law. For example, when the Supreme Court determined in Gertz that
a private person libel plaintiff did not have to prove actual malice, and
the majority of the states reacted by allowing recovery in cases of negli-
gence, it laid the foundation for application of the principle to privacy.
Adding an additional sentence to Cantrell to the effect that private
persons bringing privacy actions must prove whatever the state standard
is for defamation plaintiffs would not have plunged the Supreme Court
into constitutional crisis. It would not have generated cries of imperial
judiciary. It would, in fact, have been uncontroversial when compared to
some of the Court's actions in the past that have deservedly precipitated
constitutional crises.
The requirement of contiguousness also would prevent courts from
ruling on issues in an unrelated area of law. The Court in Cantrell, for
example, could not have leaped to the point of asserting that false-light
privacy no longer exists as a separate cause of action. Such an issue is
clearly not contiguous to Gertz. Because standard of liability is an issue
directly emanating from Gertz, the Court could have ruled that Gertz's
standard would apply to false-light cases.
3) Contiguous decision-making will allow the Court to anticipate important
first amendment questions.
First amendment cases occupy an important, but relatively minor,
portion of the Supreme Court's time. Contiguous decision-making rec-
ognizes that first amendment questions left unsettled by the case at hand
may remain so for years. For example, the standard of liability in false-
light privacy cases involving private person plaintiffs has been left unset-
tled for sixteen years. There is no indication that the Court will, in the
foreseeable future, be able to resolve this question. While supporters of
the first amendment may applaud such inaction in this case because me-
dia organizations enjoy greater protection from false-light suits in those
jurisdictions that apply Hill, there is a larger question about the viability
of the first amendment: Should it mean something different in every
state?
In an era where supporters of a free press have viewed the Supreme
Court as hostile to first amendment claims, there has been an effort to
reinvigorate freedom of speech and press provisions of state constitutions
and to seek relief in state courts. 145 Those efforts have resulted in widely
145. See generally Kolbert, In Civil Liberties Cases, New York's Court Leans on the State
Constitution, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at A12, col. 1.
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varying standards being applied in first amendment cases.1 46 Moreover,
because many news organizations transmit their articles and broadcasts
across state lines, the first amendment should be enforced through na-
tional standards, and litigants should not be able to search for the judicial
forum most hostile to first amendment interests.
47
The Supreme Court must have known that its refusal to apply Gertz
would leave the status of Hill unsettled for private person plaintiffs. It
must have also known that lower courts would come to widely varying
conclusions about the standard for private persons. Even in a federal
system that both appreciates and respects the role of states, subjecting
the first amendment to state-by-state adjudication cannot be character-
ized as protective of the freedoms guaranteed under the amendment.
4) Contiguous decision-making will be used to extend the holding beyond the
facts in a case only if there is sufficient precedent.
The establishment of new legal principles, through either traditional
or contiguous decision-making, requires a firm basis in precedent. With-
out such precedent, the application of contiguous decision-making would
be inappropriate. The case of Branzburg v. Hayes 4 illustrates this
point. In Branzburg, the Supreme Court narrowly held that journalists
do not have a constitutional right to withhold information about a crime
from law enforcement authorities, even if that means revealing the names
of confidential sources. 149
Unfortunately, Branzburg involved an unrepresentative set of cir-
cumstances. The reporter actually witnessed a crime being committed,
namely the production and possession of illegal drugs. Under more com-
mon circumstances, journalists report on crimes they have been told
about but did not actually witness themselves.
Because of the unusual facts of the case and the limiting effect of a
concurring opinion recognizing a reporter's privilege in certain circum-
146. Such a contrast can be seen by comparing Washington state and Pennsylvania in defa-
mation cases. Pennsylvania courts have been most hospitable to even public official plaintiffs
suing news organizations for allegedly defamatory statements made about their official duties.
See Labunski, supra note 15, at 90. Washington, on the other hand, has been very protective
of news organizations, even creating "shield protection" against forcing reporters to reveal the
names of sources that is more expansive than anything the legislature would have considered.
See State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wash. 2d 749, 689 P.2d 392 (1984); Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98
Wash. 2d 638, 658 P.2d 641 (1983); Senear v. Daily J.-Am., 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180
(1982).
147. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783 (1984).
148. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
149. Id. at 690.
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stances, 5 ° lower courts have often ignored the majority opinion and
adopted the three-part test mentioned in two dissenting opinions.15
Even in this situation, however, contiguous decision-making could
not be employed because there was no ample precedent leading the
Supreme Court to establish such a privilege for reporters. The Court
could not, for example, have said that "in cases in which the reporter
does not witness a crime, such a privilege exists."
Although the confusion that resulted from Branzburg is similar to
the problems created by Hill, Gertz, and Cantrell, correction of
Branzburg by contiguous decision-making would have required too dras-
tic a leap in reasoning. Yet in both circumstances, some lower courts
have used the confusion to provide greater first amendment protection
than the Supreme Court formulated.
5) Contiguous decision-making will allow the Supreme Court to clarify issues
that have already created confusion in the lower courts, including
inter-jurisdictional disputes, even if the facts of the case at
hand do not directly address those conflicts.
In several important first amendment areas, the Supreme Court has
refused to resolve conflicting decisions by different federal circuits. Even
when it had granted certiorari and heard arguments in an important
case that provided the Court with the opportunity to make a definitive
150. Id at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
151. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion listed the "three minimal tests," which stated that
the government must clearly show that
"there is probable cause to believe that the reporter possesses information which is
specifically relevant to a specific probable violation of law[,]... that the information
it seeks cannot be obtained by alternative means, which is to say, from sources other
than the reporter[,] . . . [and that] a compelling and overriding interest in the infor-
mation [exists]."
408 U.S. at 713 n. 1 (Douglas J., dissenting) (quoting brief for N.Y. Times as amicus curiae 29);
Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d
1134 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818.(1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); McGraw-Hill v. Arizona, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982);
Riley v. Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433
(10th Cir. 1977); In re Consumers Union, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2119 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973); People v. Bova, 118
Misc. 2d 14, 460 N.Y.S.2d 230 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wash. 2d 749, 689
P.2d 392 (1984); Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98 Wash. 2d 638, 658 P.2d 641 (1983); Senear
v. Daily J.-Am., 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982); see also Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978). But see United States
v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988); Storer Communications, Inc. v. Gi-
ovan, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1982);
Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1978); Kansas v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573,
581 P.2d 812 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979); Maine v. Hohler, 15 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1611 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1988).
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ruling on the power of judges to hold journalists in contempt for violat-
ing unconstitutional orders, it declined to do so.152
The first amendment often clashes with the contempt power of
judges. On the one hand, judges must be able to enforce their decisions
and vindicate the authority of courts by punishing those who disobey
judicial orders."5 3 Yet serious constitutional questions arise when the
contempt power is used to punish journalists who disobey orders later
held invalid."5 4
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v. Dickin-
son that if a journalist disobeys a judicial order, the contempt citation
that punished such disobedience will stand even if the order is later held
unconstitutional. 15 5 The court believed that such a position was neces-
sary to ensure the legitimacy of courts. The First Circuit later came to
the opposite conclusion in In re Providence, holding that an unconstitu-
tional order cannot support a contempt citation. 156
The Supreme Court agreed to hear Providence to settle the issues
raised by Dickinson, Providence, and related cases. After hearing oral
argument, but before issuing an opinion, the Court unexpectedly dis-
missed the writ of certiorari on procedural grounds. 5 7 As a result, the
First Circuit's opinion in Providence stands and continues to be in direct
conflict with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Dickinson. It may be many
years before the Supreme Court again has the opportunity to settle the
issue of whether journalists who disobey unconstitutional orders are al-
lowed to challenge them collaterally when appealing contempt
convictions.
152. United States v. Providence J. Co., 484 U.S. 814 (1987).
153. See generally Labunski, The Collateral Bar Rule and the First Amendment: The Con-
stitutionality of Enforcing Unconstitutional Orders, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 323 (1988).
154. See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); In re Providence J. Co., 820 F.2d
1342 (1st Cir. 1986) (reversing district court's contempt order), modified on reh'g en banc, 820
F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed sub nom. United States v. Providence J. Co., 485 U.S.
693 (1988); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (1st Cir. 1972). Journalists argue that
the news event, often a criminal trial, will remain newsworthy for only a limited period of time,
and they cannot wait for an invalid order to be overturned on appeal. See Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). Courts would argue, however, that no litigant knows in
advance what orders will be declared unconstitutional, and that everyone must obey a judicial
order until modified or overturned. Walker, 388 U.S. at 317; Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 509.
155. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 509.
156. In re Providence J. Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986) (reversing district court's con-
tempt order), modified on reh'g en banc, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed sub.
nom. United States v. Providence J. Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
157. United States v. Providence J. Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988). The Court held that the
special counsel appointed by the federal district court in Providence had failed to properly
obtain the attorney general's signature on the consent form granting the attorney the right to
appeal in the name of the United States.
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Under the principle of contiguous decision-making the Court could
have issued an opinion in the case despite procedural flaws in the appeals
process. Instead, the Court chose to allow the jurisdictional variance and
confusion to continue. 158
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has failed in a series of im-
portant libel cases to clearly state which party has the burden of proof in
libel cases involving private person plaintiffs.' 59 In the years since Gertz,
the Court has had numerous opportunities to clarify whether a plaintiff
must prove that the allegedly libelous statement was false, or the news
organization had to prove it was true. Instead, the Supreme Court ap-
parently assumed that lower courts would be able to read Gertz and its
progeny with a sophisticated eye that discerned what the Court had indi-
rectly stated in Gertz.
Gertz displaced the libel laws of all fifty states by requiring plaintiffs,
whether public officials, public figures, or private persons, to demonstrate
at least a minimal level of fault on the part of the publisher before collect-
ing damages."6° But the Court stopped there. It left lower courts and
commentators to determine the next step in the analysis: Because all
plaintiffs must prove fault, and a truthful statement can never constitute
fault, all plaintiffs, including private persons, have the burden of proof,
namely that the statements made about them were false.16 1
158. Washington state, for example, rejected the "collateral bar" rule (prohibiting a jour-
nalist from "collaterally" challenging the validity of the original order while appealing the
contempt conviction) in State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971), but allowed a contempt conviction to stand even
while concluding that the original order was invalid in Mead School Dist. v. Mead Educ. Ass'n
(Mead 1), 85 Wash. 2d 140, 530 P.2d 302 (1975), and Mead School Dist. v. Mead Educ. Ass'n
(Mead H), 85 Wash. 2d 278, 534 P.2d 561 (1975). See also State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364,
679 P.2d 353 (1984). The rulings have been somewhat contradictory in other states. Compare
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966) with State v.
Chavez, 123 Ariz. 538, 601 P.2d 301 (1979). Jurisdictions rejecting the "collateral bar" rules
include the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Providence J. Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (Ist Cir.
1986), modified on reh'g en banc, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed sub nom.
United States v. Providence J. Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988); California, in In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d
137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968); Illinois, in Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc.,
50 Ill. App. 3d 250, 365 N.E.2d 746 (1977); Massachusetts, in Fitchburg v. 707 Main Corp.,
369 Mass. 748, 343 N.E.2d 149 (1976). Alabama upheld the collateral bar rule in Ex Parte
Purvis, 382 So. 2d 512 (Ala. 1980).
159. This issue is considered important because it has long been assumed that if news orga-
nizations had to prove, under penalty of libel judgment, the accuracy of every statement they
make, it would cause substantial self-censorship where both false and truthful statements
would be deterred. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1973); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
160. 418 U.S. at 347.
161. See Labunski, supra note 15, at 91-99; see also Prager, Public Figures and the Public
Interest, 30 STAN. L. REV. 175-76 (1977).
1990]
At least one state supreme court was unable to make that logical
connection. In Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 1 62 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that Gertz had not undone the long-held
practice in the commonwealth of requiring the defendant to prove the
truthfulness of the statements. The court held that one's reputation is
presumed to be good until proven otherwise by the publisher of the alleg-
edly libelous statement.
In Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. v. Hepps, 163 decided twelve years
after Gertz, the Supreme Court corrected the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's misunderstanding and clarified the rule that private persons in-
volved in matters of public interest have the burden of proof.
In the intervening twelve years between Gertz and Hepps, the Court
apparently did not find the right occasion to clearly state who had the
burden of proof. Contiguous decision-making would certainly have al-
lowed the Court to do so not only in Gertz, but in several of its
progeny. 1 "
6) Contiguous decision-making will not set off a "chain reaction" which
endlessly requires the Court to make a ruling on each contiguous
issue.
Three years after the Supreme Court created the "public official"
category of libel plaintiffs in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 165 it created
the additional designation of "public figure." 166 The Court held that in-
dividuals involved in matters of public interest must meet the same stan-
dard of liability, namely actual malice, as public officials. Justice Harlan
162. 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374 (1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
163. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
164. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), which has several false-light privacy
elements, the Court could have stated that Mrs. Firestone, as a private person, did or did not
bear the burden of proof. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), and Wolston v. Read-
ers' Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979), both having private persons plaintiffs involved in mat-
ters of public interest, provided the Court with an opportunity to state on which party the
burden of proof should fall. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), may have provided still
another occasion for stating which party had the burden of proof. The case went to the
Supreme Court on the issue of whether a journalist must divulge his thought processes and his
communications with colleagues during the preparation of a television news report. Herbert
involved procedural questions related to the discovery process and certainly provided, under a
contiguous decision-making scheme, the opportunity to discuss a related procedural question,
namely which party has the burden of proof. Herbert did, however, involve a public figure
plaintiff, not a private person.
165. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The status of the libel plaintiff is crucial because public officials
and public figures must prove actual malice, while private persons in almost every state must
prove only negligence. See Labunski, supra note 15, at 99-100.
166. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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specifically stated that the court had no occasion to determine the
breadth of the new public figure category. 167
Under contiguous decision-making, the Court did enough by creat-
ing the public figure category, a decision that was clearly "contiguous" to
the public official designation in New York Time& It need not have taken
the additional step of listing those who would be considered public
figures. Although Court discussion of that issue would have had some
value, it would not have been meaningful until the Court created the
"private person" category in Gertz seven years later.'68
7) Contiguous decision-making should be employed in cases that appear to
have "landmark" status to protect that case's authority.
Court decisions that settle a conflict in a particular set of circum-
stances often generate litigation to determine what is lawful in a slightly
different set of circumstances. Issues are continually raised for reconsid-
eration in subsequent cases. The additional cases lead to the perception
that nothing is finally settled; that there is no certainty or finality in the
judicial process.
Contiguous decision-making could be utilized to enhance the prece-
dential value of what already appears to be an important case. State-
ments beyond the holding required by the facts, if made carefully, will
indicate that an appellate court wants to use the current case as a vehicle
for dealing with an array of related matters. Covering those additional,
or contiguous, issues in a single case will preserve its "landmark" status
and may limit lower court variance and a corresponding diminution of
the authority of the landmark case.
V
Conclusion
Whatever the potential for abuse of contiguous decision-making, it
cannot be any worse than allowing compelling first amendment issues to
remain unsettled for long periods of time. The result of such delay is
167. Id. at 155 (Harlan, J., writing for the Court).
168. The Court established and refined "public official" and "public figure" designations in
Saint Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); and private persons in Wolston v.
Readers' Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 652 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979);
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1979); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 448 (1976);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court specifically defined "private
persons" and "public figures" in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974), and
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1979).
1990]
substantial variance in vital first amendment rights from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
Granting courts limited authority to extend the holding of a case
beyond the facts, and giving that extension precedential value, is not as
controversial as it initially may appear. The first amendment itself be-
came applicable to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment in an offhand, extraneous statement unnecessary to
deciding the case.' 69 The "preferred position" theory that has governed
thinking about the first amendment for nearly half a century began in a
footnote of a case having nothing to do with freedom of expression. 170
Contiguous decision-making will give the courts some needed flexi-
bility in a limited number of first amendment cases. Although there may
be some enhancement of courts' overall authority, contiguous decision-
making does not pose a threat to either the other branches of government
or the rights protected by the Constitution. On the contrary, contiguous
decision-making potentially offers courts the opportunity to provide ad-
ditional first amendment protection to those whose rights would be
abridged by laws or administrative action that interferes with free expres-
sion. Moreover, in an era of national news organizations, contiguous de-
cision-making may provide the Supreme Court the opportunity to
"nationalize" important aspects of first amendment law, thus preventing
states clearly hostile to first amendment interests from inhibiting the ex-
ercise of freedom of speech and press within their borders.
Such additional authority would not create an "imperial" judiciary
more powerful than the one that exists today. If judiciously applied, con-
tiguous decision-making would allow courts to use carefully selected
cases as a vehicle to answer first amendment questions that would other-
wise linger for years, or indefinitely. Far from posing a danger to the first
amendment, contiguous decision-making may well enhance its vitality.
169. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
170. For discussion of "preferred position" theory, see supra note 16.
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